The structural transformation of China-or the reallocation of resources from the agricultural sector to the nonagricultural sector-between 1978 and 2003 was truly remarkable. We develop a two-sector neoclassical growth model to quantitatively assess the driving forces of China's recent structural transformation. In addition to the forces currently emphasized in the literature-sectoral productivity growth-we show that China's transformation was accelerated significantly by the gradual reduction in the relative size of the Chinese government.
Introduction
Between 1978 and 2003, the Chinese economy experienced a real annual rate of total GDP growth of 8.4 percent, a performance that makes China the most rapidly growing economy in the world during this period. Labor productivity grew during this period at a remarkable 5.7 percent per year. At the same time the Chinese economy experienced what is often labelled a "structural transformation:" resources were reallocated away from the agricultural sector and into nonagriculutural activities. There exists a growing literature analyzing similar episodes in various countries and time periods, and our paper contributes to this literature. 1 We develop a model to quantitatively assess the driving forces of China's recent structural transformation. However, we argue that, in addition to the forces currently emphasized in the literature, namely sectoral productivity growth, the Chinese transformation was also accelerated, to a significant We measure the contributions of three key exogenous driving forces in China's structural transformation. Productivity growth in agriculture and nonagriculture constitute two of these forces, and in considering them we relate to the already existing literature on structural transformations such as Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Rogerson (2008) . 3 Briefly in our model set-up, increases in productivity growth in both the agricutural and nonagricultural sectors induce a decline in agriculture's share of employment and output. Specifically, we build a model where the income elasticity of agricultural goods is less than one so that as income increases, resources are shifted away from agriculture and into the 2 Total private output is the sum of agricultural output and private nonagricultural output. 3 Recent papers on structural transformations tend to be divided into two types: those that base structural transformations on sectoral differences in productivity growth (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007) , and those that base structural transformations on sectoral differences in income demand elasticities (Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie, 2001 ). There are also models combining both types of models (Rogerson, 2008) .
nonagricultural sector. Increases in productivity in both the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors raise income, and lower the relative demand for agricultural goods, resulting in a flow of labor from agriculture into nonagriculture.
In the case of the Chinese economy, however, we should consider another potential driving force: the reduction in the size of the Chinese government which took place during the period we analyze. Figure 3 shows the reduction in the government's share of total output. We conjecture that reduced government intervention affected the allocation of resources across sectors in China through an income effect. As the relative size of the Chinese public sector shrank, inefficiencies were reduced and income rose, thus, reducing the relative size of agriculture, given the less than unitary income elasticity of agricultural goods.
Thus, each of the three driving variables we consider act towards reallocating resources away from agriculture. This paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we briefly describe the Chinese aggregate statistics, relegating a more complete description to the Data Appendix. For our purpose, it is particularly important to distinguish between the private and public sectors. We explain our classification and perform a growth accounting exercise to measure Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in the private agricultural and nonagricultural sectors-two of our driving forces. We show that while TFP growth in agriculture was much higher than in nonagriculture overall, as in Young (2003) , this comparison masks the large discrepancy in TFP growth rates between the private and public nonagricultural sectors. We show that between 1978 and 2003, average TFP growth rates in the public and private nonagricultural sectors were 0.5 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively.
In Section 3, we develop our model economy, and analyze its properties. Our model is a version of the optimal growth model with two sectors. It has two noteworthy components. First there is a government characterized by a sequence of exogenous income tax rates and employment. Fiscal revenue is assumed to be redistributed to households through a lump-sum transfer. Second preferences are characterized by the presence of a "subsistence level" of consumption for the agricultural good. This feature of the model is the source of the income effect shifting resources away from agriculture as income rises.
In Section 4, we perform our quantitative analysis. Our exercise consists, first, in constructing a baseline calibration where the key parameters are chosen so that our model exhibits the same output and employment shares of agriculture as in the Chinese economy in 1978. In this baseline calibration we let the sectoral productivity variables grow at rates determined by the growth ac-counting exercise of Section 2, and we let the size of the Chinese government be given by the data displayed in Figure 3 . Armed with our baseline calibration, we proceed to compute a set of experiments where the only difference with our baseline calculation is that we let, one at a time, one of the three driving forces deviate from its baseline trend throughout the entire 1978-2003 period. We interpret the discrepancies between our baseline results and our "counterfactuals" as measuring the contribution of the particular driving variable in explaining China's structural transformation.
Data
All data cited in this Section, unless otherwise noted, are from the annual issues of the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (CSY), issued by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB). 4 Views among Chinese economy specialists differ as to the reliability of Chinese official economic statistics. Young (2003) and Rawski (2004) As mentioned earlier, the main challenge for our purpose is to classify the Chinese data into our three sectors of interest: the agricultural sector, the nonagricultural public sector, and the nonagricultural private sector.
The agricultural sector is defined as the primary industry, which includes forestry, livestock, and fishing. Liberalization of the Chinese agricultural sector started from the introduction of the household responsibility system in 1981, in which farmers could sell at market prices agricultural products produced above quota. While acknowledging that the Chinese agricultural sector was not completely liberalized in the early 1980s, we assume in our model that the agricultural sector was market driven by this time, since liberalization in this sector proceeded much faster than in the nonagricultural sector.
The nonagricultural sector is defined as the sum of the secondary and tertiary industries. In the nonagricultural public sector, we include State-owned enterprises, Collective and Cooperative units, and Township and Village enterprises (TVEs). The nonagricultural private sector includes all other types of firms, including Private enterprises, Self-employed workers, and firms with foreign investment. 5 We note that at the beginning of the reform period in 1978, the public sector produced nearly all of nonagricultural output. Even in 1990, public sector output was over 90 percent of nonagricultural output. shares we can compute a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) growth by sector. Note that our measure of TFP overstates the importance of productivity per se, since it also reflects human capital accumulation. Nonetheless, this is the measure that is consistent with the model we develop in Section 3. Unlike in capitalist economies, in China, there are conceptual difficulties in classifying firms into the public and private sectors. In particular, Township and Village enterprisesthe largest employer in China since the early 1990s (about 135 million workers)-are owned and operated by local governments. Much has been made about how these TVEs owned by local governments actually operate like private corporations. Although China's local governments may try to operate a miniature state-run economy, ultimately each local producer is subjected to competition from thousands of other villages. In this competitive environment, each local government faces a relatively hard budget constraint; and has to make its own enterprise economically successful (Naughton, 2007, Ch. 12) . On the other hand, local governments do serve as guarantors of TVE borrowing. If that is the case, then capital allocation decisions by TVEs are not determined entirely by the market. In fact, continued government interference, and corruption are described as disadvantages of local government ownership. These disadvantages of local government ownership seem to have worsened since the mid-1990s, as employment and profitability in the TVEs have declined (Naughton, 2007, Ch. 12) . While acknowledging that the TVEs may be subject to some market forces, we classify TVEs as belonging to the public sector, since ultimately, the (local) government decides how much labor and capital that these firms employ. labor. Physical capital depreciates at rate δ and the interest rate between period t − 1 and t is denoted by r t . The rental rate of capital is then r t + δ.
Land does not depreciate. Its price during period t is denoted by q t and its rental rate between period t − 1 and t by i t . The real wage rate during period t is denoted by w t . Good a is used for consumption only, while good m is used for consumption and for capital accumulation. There is a government characterized by an exogenous sequence of employment, {h gt } , and a total "tax" rate, {τ t }. The tax revenue is redistributed through a lump sum "transfer," T t .
We interpret this "tax" as an extraction of income from the economy by the Chinese government, through the use of resources in public enterprises. The government then redistributes and returns this income to the economy through the lump sum "transfer," which again may be through public enterprises, in the provision of medical care, education, social welfare, and other benefits. As usual, this tax and redistribution scheme imposes an efficiency loss on the economy.
Each period, the household must also allocate h gt units of time to governmental work. He can choose, however, how to optimally allocate the remaining 1−h gt units between the two sectors: h at and h mt . Note that in this context part of the transfer T t can be interpreted as compensation for governmental work.
To summarize, our model has four driving variables, total factor productivity (TFP) in the agricultural sector, TFP in the private non-agricultural sector, the government "tax" rate, τ t , and government employment rate, h gt .
The Household
The preferences of the representative household are described by
where c mt and c at are consumption flows of good m and a, respectively. β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor andc a > 0 is a constant parameter which can be interpreted as a "subsistence" level of consumption of the agricultural good. In each period, the household's budget constraint is:
Household's saving during period t is denoted by s t+1 . It consists of capital and land: s t+1 = k t+1 + q t . The term T t is the lump-sum net transfer from the government.
The Firms
In the private nonagricultural sector, the technology is given by
In the agricultural sector it is
The variables h jt and k jt (j = a, m) represent employment in sector j and the capital stock, respectively. Note that the stock of land is normalized to 1. The nonagricultural sector solves
and the agricultural sector solves:
The stock of private capital, k t , is k t = k at + k mt . Note that total factor productivity, z jt , can differ across sectors both in levels and in rates of growth.
These variables constitute two of the four exogenous driving forces in the model economy.
Equilibrium
Given a sequence of taxes {τ t } and public employment {h gt }, an equilibrium is a sequence of prices {w t , r r , i t , p t , q t } and allocations for firms {k mt , h mt } and {k at , h at }, and the household {c mt , c at } such that
1. The sequence {c mt , c at } maximizes (1) subject to (2) given prices;
2. The sequence {k mt , h mt } solves (3) given prices, at every period;
3. The sequence {k at , h at } solves (4) given prices, at every period;
4. The labor market clears: h mt + h at = 1 − h gt ;
5. The goods market clears: c mt + k t+1 = y mt + (1 − δ) k t
The government's budget is balanced: [w
t (1 − h gt ) + (1 + r t ) s t ] τ t = T t
Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative exercise is the following. We calibrate the parameters of our model and simulate transition paths for the main variables of interest: the agricultural shares of employment and output. Our calibration strategy has two aspects. First, we exploit the information provided by our growth accounting exercise. Namely, we use the factor shares in agriculture and nonagriculture as given in Section 2. We also use the growth rates of Total Factor Productivity in each sector, given in Table 1 . There are three parameters not pinned down by this exercise: the subsistence level of agricultural consumption,c a , the initial level of agricultural TFP, z a1 , and the intial capital stock in the nonagricultural sector, k m1 . We choose these parameters so that in the first period of our model economy, agriculture's share of private output and private employment, and the output to capital ratio in nonagriculture are close, in a least square sense, to their empirical counterparts in 1978. We emphasize that we do not attempt to fit our model to the time paths of agricultural employment or to output.
Instead, we interpret the gap between the model's predictions for these paths, and their empirical counterparts, as a measure of the quantitative importance of the mechanisms at work in our model economy. We then proceed to simulate the same transition paths under a set of couterfactual alternatives regarding the driving forces of the model. This exercise allows us the assess what mechanisms are quantitatively the most important in generating our baseline results.
Calibration
The factor shares α, µ and φ are discussed in Section 3 and in the Data Appendix. We use α = 0.54 for the capital share in the nonagricultural sector, and µ = 0.12 and φ = 0.76 for the capital and labor shares in the agricultural sector, respectively. We set β = 1.02/1.07 and δ = 0.05. This value for β is consistent with a long-run growth rate of 2 percent per year and a rate of return of 7 percent. For the paths of {z mt } and {z at } we use the data presented in To calibrate the sequence of "tax" rates τ t we use the share of public output to total output as shown in Figure 3 . We interpret this share as the income extracted by the Chinese government from the economy through the operation of public enterprises, ie. a "tax." Again, we need to take a stand on the path of τ t beyond 2003. In our baseline exercise we assume that it remains constant at 30 percent, i.e., the value that τ t reaches in the data in 2003. As a socialist economy, China's public output as a proportion of total output is historically quite high.
Three parameters remain:c a , the subsitence level of consumption, z a1 , the initial level of agricultural TFP and k m1 the initial stock of capital in the nonagricultural sector. 6 We pick them to minimize the distance between the model and the data, in terms of the initial share of agricultural employment and output:
Baseline Results
Our baseline calibration is displayed in Table 2 . Figures 5 and 6 show the model's prediction for the employment and output shares of agriculture, versus their empirical counterparts. Note again that we compare the size of agriculture to that of the total private sector, which is the sum of agricultural employment (output) and private nonagricultural employment (output). The mechanisms at work in our baseline exercise tend to overpredict the transition of labor out of agriculture and underpredict the shift in output from agriculture to nonagriculture.
The first two lines of Tables 3 and 4 
Counterfactual Experiments
We now proceed to simulate our model economy under a set of alternative assumptions regarding the driving forces. We start by considering three alternatives. In the first experiment, we set z mt = z m1 for all periods, while leaving {z at } and {τ t } as they were in the baseline calibration. In the second experiment we set z at = z a1 for all periods, while {z mt } and {τ t } remain the same as in the baseline. Finally, in our third experiment, we keep the tax rate constant, τ t = τ 1 for all periods while the sectoral TFPs are allowed to grow as in the baseline calibration. It should not be surprising, therefore, to see that when a specific exogenous variable stays constant at its initial level, the structural transformation is less pronounced than in the baseline calibration.
Quantitatively, agricultural productivity is the most important force driving the structural transformation of the Chinese economy. When agricultural TFP remains constant, the model predicts only 59 percent of the decline in the agricultural employment share in the baseline case (Table 3) . When nonagricultural TFP remains constant, however, the model still predicts 88 percent of the baseline case.
The reduction in the government "tax" rate contributed significantly to China's structural transformation. When the tax rate remains constant at its initial level, the model predicts only 78 percent of its baseline in terms of the agricultural employment share, and 81 percent of the baseline in terms of the agricultural output share (Tables 3 and 4 ). Our view is that this sectoral transformation was induced through an income effect. The fall in distortions caused by the decline in government activity raised income. Given our non-homothetic utility function, this fall in income resulted in the relative decline in food demand, and a relative decline in agricultural employment. 
Conclusion
Some critics may argue that there is no sensible way to use a customary general equilibrium growth model such as ours to understand the evolution of the Chinese economy since 1978, an economy potentially rife with price, wage, and other distortions Young (2000) . Our results show, however, that our model captures well, the structural transformation of China, the reallocation of labor and output out of agriculture into nonagriculture. Specifically, we show that in explaining China's structural transformation, high productivity growth in the agricultural sector and the gradual privatization of the Chinese economy were pivotal. In particular, we show that the gradual reduction in the share of the Chinese government in the economy was an important force of this structural transformation, by reducing inefficiencies, raising income, and thus lowering the demand for agricultural goods relative to that of nonagricultural goods. 7 The fall in the share of agricultural employment did not simply occur because the decline in the share of public employment. Recall that from 1978 to 2003, there is no long run trend in the share of public employment out of total employment (Figure 1 ).
Employment by Sector
Total employment in State-owned enterprises, Collective and Cooperative units, TVEs, Private and other firms, and the Self-employed are given in the CSY.
The CSY also gives the number of employees in each of these sectors that work in agriculture, so we can net out agricultural employment from total employment; and calculate the number of nonagricultural workers in public and private enterprises. The CSY does not break down GDP, a value added measure, into the public and private sectors for our entire sample period. However, it breaks down nonagricultural gross output into the State-owned, Collective, Cooperative, TVE, and the Private sectors, so that nonagricultural gross output can be allocated to each of these sectors. We make the assumption that the share of intermediate inputs is the same in all sectors; so that the ratio of net to gross outputs are the 8 Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu (BHZ, 2005) suggest that the number of agricultural workers reported in the CSY is upward biased, because the CSY assumes that all rural workers are employed in agriculture, when in fact, some rural workers are self-employed or employed in rural industry. BHZ subtract from the total number of agricultural workers, the number of rural workers involved in self-employment and in private enterprises. BHZ's procedure, however, may understate the number of agricultural workers, to the extent that many rural workers have dual jobs, in both agriculture and nonagriculture. Cai, Park, and Zhao (2004) present survey evidence, showing that in 2000, 43 percent of farm household members worked off the farm. Because of the inherent difficulty in classifying rural workers, here we take "as is" the CSY classification of agricultural and nonagricultural workers.
same. 9 We then simply allocate total nonagricultural GDP to the public and private sectors; according to the allocation of gross outputs.
Capital and Land by Sector
Total (2003)). We obtain the starting stock of capital at the end of 1978 from Chow (1993) .
Finally, while we assume that labor and capital are the only two inputs in the nonagricultural sector, we allow for land inputs in the agricultural sector.
We measure total land inputs by the total sown area of farm crops in China (as in McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu, 1989). These data are available in the CSY.
The total sown area of farm crops has remained essentially fixed, growing at an Preferences β = 0.95,c a = 0.43 Technology α = 0.54, µ = 0.12, φ = 0.76, δ = 0.05 {z mt } = data, z m1 = 1.0 {z at } = data, z a1 = 1.02 Government {τ t } = data {h gt } = data 
